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‘Murketing’ and the Rhetoric of the New Sincerity 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that marketing scholars should be paying a lot more attention to the rhetorical 
form which the economic historian Philip Mirowski - following the novelist David Foster 
Wallace - calls murketing. Combining philosophical, historical, economic and fictional 
resources, the paper first produces a synthetic account of what murketing is. Blurring calculated 
dishonesty with impassioned sincerity, murketing operationalises a double-truth dialectic 
which treats consumers as both subjects and objects within the process of their own persuasion. 
In order to indicate how murketing works, the paper then considers recent examples from 
murketing practice where allusions are made which are both cynical and gnostic, both 
conceited and intimate, and both earnest and ironic. The paper closes by indicating how its 
account of the theory and practice of murketing might inform the future study, consumption 
and regulation of advertising and marketing communications. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
The secret of success is sincerity.  
If you can fake that, you’ve got it made. 
 
-- Not Just Groucho Marx (O’Toole, 2012) 
 
For Aristotle, rhetoric was the craft - or technique - of producing persuasive arguments (1984a). 
In as much as we would be wrong to automatically characterise a person as a skilled musician 
by virtue of their having struck a single piano key, we would be similarly mistaken, on 
Aristotle’s account, to speak of someone who once persuaded somebody of something as a 
skilled rhetorician. For just as the pianist demonstrates their technical excellence - or ineptitude 
- through the activity of piano-playing, the rhetorician’s competence is assessed by the means 
of the evidence provided by their performance and its audience effects. “For one swallow”, as 
he puts it in his Nicomachean Ethics, “does not make a summer” (1984b: 1735).  In all crafts, 
as far as Aristotle accounts for them, gradual improvement - let alone eventual mastery - is 
much more a product of involved practice than it is of disinterested learning.  
 
To say that rhetoric is a craft or technique, in the Aristotelian sense, is to say that it is a speech 
act which cannot only concern epistemologists. This is not to say that rhetoricians do not make 
knowledge claims: they demonstrably do. It is rather to recognise that the way in which they 
do so is principally animated by the end of persuasiveness, rather than the requirement for 
correspondence. In the case of those interested in making adequate knowledge claims, it 
suffices that their language be clear, correct and indubitable. The ways in which orators make 
knowledge claims, by contrast, reveals more about the nature of their craft than it does about 
the object(s) of which they speak (see Heidegger, 2003: 5-44). While persuasion might result 
from the orator’s mastery of a craft, pedagogical demonstration necessarily results from the 
teacher’s possession of knowledge.   
 
If there is a characteristic which sets rhetoric apart from other crafts, it is in its production of 
practical anthropological effects – political-economic effects included – out of language itself. 
To recognise this characteristic as a defining feature of language, rather than as one of its 
lamentable deficiencies, is one of the many points on which Aristotle broke with his teacher 
Plato. Whereas the master raised many critical questions about whether sophistry (1997a, 
1997b) and poetry (1997c: 998-1052), should produce practical effects which might follow 
more from the sophistication of their language than from the essence of their objects, the 
student set himself to the task of considering how rhetoricians have persuaded their audiences 
into dispositions and actions.  
 
The singularly practical importance of rhetorical skill, Aristotle claims, comes to the fore in 
public situations where logical guarantees for the rightness of particular courses of action 
cannot be given while persuasive arguments nevertheless might (see Cassin, 2000; Gasché, 
2017). Hence the importance which Hannah Arendt (1954: 43-44) places on diametrically 
opposing rhetoric’s argumentative egalitarianism to the coercion, violence and obedience 
which she held to have been characteristic of authoritarian speech situations (see also Wurfat, 
2015). With Aristotle, Arendt encourages us to appreciate rhetoric as a characteristic of public 
life which, against Plato, she also believes to be desirable, at best, and preferable, at least.  
 
While Aristotle places special emphasis on the importance of rhetorical skill in the production 
of legal arguments, his account of the craft of persuasion has also played a crucial role within 
economic, commercial, marketing and advertising practice (e.g. Hirschman, 1977; McCloskey, 
1985, 2006; McQuarrie and Mick, 1996; O’ Shaughnessy and O’ Shaughnessy, 2004; Pocock, 
1985). David Tonks (2002) claims marketing itself can be understood as a rhetorical practice. 
This isn’t to authorise marketing’s continued encroachment upon the philosophical vocation of 
producing concepts (see Deleuze and Guattari, 2009: 146, see also Lecercle, 1996: 44 and 
Žižek, 2004: 183-187) but to constrain marketing within the strictures of rhetoric and 
persuasion. Rhetoric, in this sense, is not a craft which is necessarily anti-philosophical but one 
which is essentially non-philosophical, a-philosophical, even. In what follows we will consider 
how a particular form of marketing – murketing – persuades its audience(s) by simultaneously 
appealing to and breaking with sincerity.    
 
Marketing scholarship has long treated the humanities as a credible conceptual and empirical 
resource (e.g. Belk et al., 1989; Bradshaw and Brown, 2018; Eid, 1999; Fitchett, 2002; 
Hirschman, 1986; Jack, 2004; Pollay, 1986; Stern, 1988; Stern, 1990; Stokes, 1998). This 
tradition also enriches our understanding of the rhetoric of murketing. The phenomenon has 
not received much of our attention to date and this paper redresses this imbalance by 
introducing murketing as the product of a brief encounter between the work of an economic 
historian – Philip Mirowski - and a literary text – David Foster Wallace’s Mr Squishy. It then 
elaborates upon Leo Strauss’s account of double interpretation and Lionel Trilling’s account 
of duplicitous self-presentation insofar as these bear upon the task of describing murketing. 
This interrelated elaboration is warranted by the fact that Mirowski suggests Strauss while 
Wallace scholarship foregrounds Trilling. The paper then elaborates upon its conceptualisation 
of murketing through recent examples and closes with implications for the future study, 
consumption and regulation of advertising and marketing communications. 
 
WHAT IS MURKETING? 
 
Irony and the Free Murketeers 
 
According to the economic historian Philip Mirowski, consumers are miscast as autonomous 
maximisers of marginal utility and as epiphenomenal residues of false consciousness. JK 
Galbraith’s revelation of the dependency effect, within which consumption comes to be 
analysed as a function of supply and demand (1998; see also Galbraith 1967, c.f. Mirowski, 
2013: 139), helped dethrone the sovereign homo oeconomicus of classical liberal economics 
(see also Brown, 2015; Crouch, 2011; Davies, 2014; Davies and McGoey 2012; Davies and 
Dunne, 2016; Foucault, 2008, 2007). This revolution failed to install a new sovereign, however, 
since “no one in their right mind would willingly concede that they were a hapless dupe of 
remote powerful economic interests” (Mirowski, 2013: 139-140; see also Graeber, 2011; Fine 
2013). Subsequent theorists, analysts and negotiators of consumer agency, Mirowski proposes, 
sought rather to produce a more plausible and palatable alternative to the false needs hypothesis 
on consumer agency. So what happened when those compelled, for a mixture of intellectual 
and political reasons, to predicate market phenomena upon liberal subjectivity, “carefully read 
and absorbed their leftist critics” (p. 140)? Mirowski suggests that:  
 
far from rejecting them outright, they openly use their ideas to render the process of 
persuasion both more unconscious and more effective1. Neoliberals have pioneered the 
signal innovation of importing the double-truth character of their project into the 
everyday lives of the common man. The modern hidden persuaders have gladly 
                                                          
1 Mirowski here acknowledges the contribution of Walker (2008) insofar as the neologism’s creation is concerned.    
nurtured the conviction of the average person that he is more clever than those who 
seek to manipulate him in order to render him all the more open to that manipulation 
(ibid.).  
 
We’ll elaborate upon this “double truth character” of persuasion shortly. For now, it is 
important to acknowledge that Mirowski deploys the term murketing to name the rhetorical 
craft through which market liberalism and marketing savvy intermingle in demonstrably 
complicated though not necessarily contradictory ways. While this terminological inauguration 
emerges out of a prolonged dialogue with Hayekian political economy particularly and neo-
liberal anthropology more generally (see also Caldwell, 2005; Mirowski, 2007; Mirowski and 
Plehwe, 2009, Tadajewski et al., 2014; van Horn 2015), it is to the late American novelist, 
short-story writer, essayist and journalist David Foster Wallace that Mirowski attributes both 
murketing’s technology and its phenomenology. Before quoting at length from Mister Squishy 
- a short story staged within a market research firm which dramatizes the iterative interplay 
between subjective testimony and objective data – Mirowski is uncharacteristically reverent. 
“As usual, David Foster Wallace put it best” (Mirowski, 2013: 140), he writes. And then he 
provides the following definition of murketing: 
 
a tongue-in-cheek pseudo-behind-the-scenes Story designed to appeal to urban or 
younger consumers’ self-imagined savvy about marketing tactics and objective data 
and to flatter their sense that in this age of metastatic spin and trend and the complete 
commercialization of every last thing in their world they were unprecedentedly ad-
savvy and discerning and canny and well-nigh impossible to manipulate (Wallace, 
2004: 61; c.f. Mirowski, 2013: 140). 
  
Contemporary murketing, it follows, holds earnestness at arm’s length: not so much in 
contempt as in abeyance. Public expressions of honesty, if ever there were such things, have, 
for the murketeer, always-already had their day. This is not a capitulation to dishonesty. It is 
rather the contextualisation of the contemporary marketer’s calculated double-bluff which 
anticipates the iteration of an average consumer’s responses, the firm’s playful wink to the 
spectator, the advertisement’s own revelation of an underlying strategic intention alongside – 
sometimes even on behalf of - the audience. And it is also the marketer’s skilful turning of the 
Brechtian gesture’s emancipatory ambition against itself, a gesture made none the less effective 
for its having been made unbeknownst. To break the fourth wall by acknowledging that the 
consumer, too, knows only all too well what is going on, in the way of murketing, is not to 
overcome alienation, Mirowski claims, but to exacerbate it. It is to tell the sort of in-joke within 
which demystification itself, rather than the fetishism upon which it acts, is the very butt of the 
gag.  
 
As to the phenomenology of murketing, Mirowski suggests “the topic deserves a tome unto 
itself” (ibid.: 141). Although his is not that tome, he provides two examples of what such a 
tome would analyse: snapprenticeship, aka. ‘unprimitive accumulation’ (Mirowski, 2013: 141-
144, see also Marazzi, 2010 and Ross, 2011) and buycotting, aka. ‘ethical consumerism’ 
(Mirowski, 2013: 144-148, see also Yates, 2011, Richey and Ponte, 2011). Whereas in 
snapprenticeship, the agent seeks “to bypass the market altogether” (Mirowski, 2013: 145) 
while unintentionally extending “hierarchical control and capitalist appropriation” (ibid.: 143), 
in buycotting, “participants are enticed to believe that it is possible to mitigate some of the 
worst aspects of market organization by paying an “ethical premium”” (ibid.: 145). To these 
two examples we might rightly protest that there is a lot more to ethical consumption than the 
payment of an ethical premium (e.g. Chatzidakis and Lee, 2013; Chatzidakis et al., 2012; 
Chatzidakis et al, 2007). Nevertheless, they reveal murketing phenomena to be categorically 
distinct from situations within which lies (e.g. Wheeler, 1976), nonsense (Wheen, 2004), or 
even bullshit (e.g. Frankfurt, 2009; Ball, 2017) prevail. Within murketing rhetoric - much like 
the situation within which Mirowski sees murketing itself defined (i.e. a work of fiction) - the 
verifiability of claims gives ground to the plausibility of stories (see also Booth, 1974a, 1974b, 
2009, 2010; Brown, 2005; Godin, 2012). This is not to give up on veracity as such but to pursue 
conviction along predominantly rhetorical means.   
 
In endorsing Wallace’s definition of murketing, Mirowski leans more upon literary and 
performance theory than political economy (e.g. Schudson, 1986; Ewen, 2001; Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988; Hodgson, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Akerloff and Shiller, 2015) or 
even the psy-sciences (e.g. Cialdini, 2001; Dichter, 2002; Packard, 2007; Samuel, 2010; 
Tadajewski, 2006; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). Murketing, on Mirowski’s telling, exonerates 
neither the axioms of utilitarianism nor the suspicions of Machiavellianism. Its rhetoric rather 
appeals to the consumer much in the way that authors of what Mark McGurl calls the program 
era (2009) appeal to their readers: by making a subtle issue of the relentless interplay between 
the text which is produced and the context out of which it was produced. Mirowski’s erudition 
sets an example as to how marketing rhetoric might be analysed. Let’s now survey the plotlines 
of the story of murketing’s emergence.  
 
Irony and the Double-Truth Dialectic  
 
Mirowski doesn’t say that his genuflection to Wallace is also indebted to the political 
philosopher Leo Strauss. Perhaps it isn’t. But here’s Strauss providing grounds for us to believe 
why it might be:  
 
There is hardly anyone among you, I believe, who has not seen that a contemporary 
novelist with a reasonable degree of competence tells us much more about modern 
society than volumes of social science analysis. I don’t question that social science 
analyses are very important, but still, if you want to get a broad view and a deep view 
you read a novel rather than social science (2001: 7). 
 
This apparent slur against the social sciences was made in the context of an introduction to 
political philosophy which Strauss made by means of a close reading of Plato’s Symposium. It 
is also made at an historical juncture in which the chilling prospect of nuclear apocalypse 
loomed large. In reaching back to Platonism in general, Strauss found a persuasive alternative 
to the intellectually aristocratic claims of the (social) sciences and of fiction. And in reaching 
back to Symposium in particular, Strauss bears witness to philosophy’s beating of poetry at its 
own dramatic game. Poets and orators aren’t alone in the production of beautiful speeches, 
despite everything Socrates says throughout Symposium to the contrary2.  
 
The situation depicted in the Symposium also provided Strauss with an alternative to the climate 
of cynicism which he thought to have been sanctioned – albeit unintentionally - by the liberal 
democratic axiom that everybody should have their say. Strauss knew that philosophy had no 
answer to common sense which would meet with popular appeal. He recognised, as Plato did, 
that philosophy’s opportunity to settle its scores with science and poetry would never be 
democratically sanctioned, that philosophers would never be held in high popular regard. This 
                                                          
2 Whereas Plato has Socrates eject some poets from the Republic, in Symposium (1997d; see Burnyeat, 1998) he 
has Socrates seduce all around him, Aristophanes included, to a poetically philosophical to love. While Republic 
bears witness to the political act of censorship, Symposium represents the ethical act of disputation.   
is precisely why there are no strangers or anonymous guests present at the Symposium. 
Everybody who speaks there, no matter how drunk they are, is already known to have 
something to say that might be worth listening to. They all are, that is to say, all already friends.  
 
And so, if the discussion which transpires in the Symposium strikes particular readers as 
ridiculous, that is only because they are not among its presumed audience. The participants in 
the Symposium’s dialogue listen to each other and not to strangers: they already know 
something of the character – the ethos – of each of the speakers. And that is why they take turns 
to listen, as well as to drink. The listeners already know, that is, that the speakers assembled 
are the sorts of persons they’ll allow themselves to listen to, even if what ends up getting said 
turns out to be incoherent or even wrong. For being wrong, in the Symposium’s situation, is 
everybody’s right. This is a friendly gathering, not a political assembly. It is a qualitatively 
different speech situation to one which would formalise the right of everybody to speak prior 
to the establishment of consensus. Discussions between friends and lovers are not at all like 
that: consensus is not in the nature of matters of the heart. And this is a large part of the reason 
why Strauss presented a close reading of the Symposium as the best possible introduction to 
political philosophy today: we who carefully listen in to it still have much to hear. And those 
who wouldn’t listen shouldn’t speak.   
 
The Socratic strategy of writing nothing in order to gain intimacy with one’s opponents struck 
most of Plato’s successors as more foolish than fearless. Subsequent philosophers instead 
hedged their bets upon the paradoxical authority of anonymity, upon the convenient alibi of 
aliases, upon the gesture filled production of esoteric writing, and upon many other devices 
besides. And it is this penultimate strategy of esoteric writing which Strauss ultimately wanted 
to draw our attention to. Philosophers, Strauss believed, do not write for everybody: they write 
instead only for people who know both what to pick up on and how to pick up on it. For Strauss, 
it will never be enough for contemporary readers of Plato - or of any other serious writer - to 
cherry pick phrases and aphorisms to then subsequently grant them the status of disciplinary 
or canonical dogma. As he had already platitudinously put it: “thoughtless men are careless 
readers, and only thoughtful men are careful readers” (1941: 491). And so the erudite reader, 
for whom the philosopher writes, and to whom Strauss provides his advice, either already 
knows or else will eventually come to know all of this to be the case. All others will succumb 
to liberal perspectivism, from which the refuge of paradigm incommensurability draws its 
cultural legitimacy. And that’s no way to read anything carefully. 
 
So the authorial deployment of knowing devices - especially the knowing device of irony - 
towards philosophical ends, takes on a crucial role within Straussian textual interpretation. 
Within this hermeneutical framework, ironic speech and writing isn’t simply comprehended as 
an aesthetically predisposed device. Irony also needs to be seen, it follows from Strauss, as one 
political strategy amongst others, an authorial anticipation of and response to the then prevalent 
modes of public persecution and public ridicule. Irony evokes socio-historical subtext, in other 
words. The public philosopher writes and speaks esoterically – that is to say non-literally – 
largely because s/he is mindful of the inevitability of being misinterpreted. The public 
philosopher is nevertheless hopeful that while enemies and charlatans will fall for textual 
bluffs, the presumed audience will know how to read the clues though which the author’s 
intended meaning is produced and disseminated. And long before Strauss, as Strauss himself 
shows, Plato already knew this. Hence he cast Socrates not as a narrator but as a character. So 
the Socratic deployment of irony isn’t to be understood, Strauss suggests, as the annihilation 
of meaning perpetrated by a mock-ignoramus. It is better appreciated as part of the Platonic 
textual pursuit of meaning by non-literal means.  
 
Behind the many Socratic and dialogical feints and dummies, then, there is Plato who, in 
writing the Symposium, for Strauss, wanted to settle philosophy’s scores with poetry and 
science, by staging a discussion about friendship which required the absence of enemies and 
idiots in order that it might successfully transpire.  It is in the Symposium, Strauss sought to 
show, where Plato not only staged the battle between poetry and philosophy but also settled it 
in favour of the latter.  
 
So yes, Strauss says with Mirowski: fiction better imagines social reality than the social 
sciences. But yet it is the contemplative life, he agrees with Aristotle, which is best. Mirowski’s 
account of murketing’s double-truth character, then, is neither Orwellian nor Latin-Averroist 
(Mirowski, 2013: 68). It instead draws approvingly upon Strauss’s own insistence that “all 
philosophers…must take into account the political situation of philosophy, that is, what can be 
said and what must be kept under wraps” (Smith, 2009: 18, c.f. Mirowski, 2013: 68). Mirowski 
translates Strauss’s account of exoteric writing’s requirement of careful reading from political 
philosophy into political economy. What was, for Strauss, a practical requirement to 
communicate clandestinely under threat of persecution becomes, in Mirowski’s rendition, an 
interpretive principle through which Hayek and his neo-liberal acolytes should now be read. 
Rather than being on the hunt for lies and hypocrisy, the double-truth dialectic’s hermeneutics 
encourages us to connect what is written to what is meant, to see this pair as continuous rather 
than oppositional. And this is a way of thinking about communication which, Mirowski 
contends, has descended the post-war Swiss peaks and infiltrated everyday consciousness. 
We’re all Straussians now.  
 
MURKETING AND SINCERITY 
 
Liberty / Honesty 
 
Kenneth Burke (1941) was formalising the master tropes of rhetoric around the same time that 
the double truth dialectic was finding theoretical expression in the hermeneutical work of Leo 
Strauss and practical expression in the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society. Less than a 
decade later, in The Liberal Imagination Lionel Trilling also had cause to reflect upon many 
of the same issues. “The first thing to say about” that work, according to the intellectual 
historian Louis Menand, is that it is “a cold war book” (2008a: vii). By surveying how literature 
and society overlap, Menand asserts, Trilling’s classic collection of essays, first published in 
1950, both made “literary criticism matter to people who were not literary critics” and “changed 
the role of literature in American intellectual life” (ibid.). The book evoked the paradox 
between literary efforts to express a philosophy of liberalism, on the one hand, and attempts to 
realise such ideas within political practice, on the other. It didn’t seek to dissipate this paradox 
but to deepen the complexity of its reader’s relation to it. Trilling believed that “liberalism” as 
such:   
 
is concerned with the emotions above all else, as proof of which the word happiness 
stands at the very center of its thought, but in its effort to establish the emotions, or 
certain among them, in some sort of freedom, liberalism somehow tends to deny them 
in their full possibility (2008: xviii-xix). 
 
Trilling pitted the humanities and the (social) sciences against one another insofar as their 
relative capacity to both convey happiness to its audiences and to cajole its audiences into 
happiness was concerned. The Liberal Imagination did not reject the proposals of “Hayekian 
free marketers” (Menand, 2008a: ix), or of any other post-War political ideologues. Nor did it 
affirm the value of such ideological projects, or any of their then plausible alternatives. The 
book rather consisted of a series of case studies in how liberal idealism rarely stands the test of 
political-economic reality. And it gave its readers the impression that such a discontinuity 
hasn’t just empirically been the case but that it necessarily is the case. Politics and literature, 
for Trilling, stem from identical roots in that both draw upon implicit theories of human pathos 
in order to achieve their respective ends. The political task of putting pathos to work, of course, 
is qualitatively distinct from the literary craft through which pathos is produced, schematised 
and idealised. And so to Trilling’s mind political practice, from the Ancient Greeks onwards:  
 
unconsciously limits its view of the world to what it can deal with, and it unconsciously 
tends to develop theories and principles, particularly in relation to the nature of the 
human mind, that justify its limitation (2008: xix). 
 
Much the same could surely be said of murketing’s power to persuade, relative to that of the 
novelist. The reality principle, that is to say, makes itself known within the coordination of 
human affairs – political or commercial - in ways that it need constrain novelists. Whereas 
fantastical utopianism is warranted within the literary imagination (Elias, 2009), the political 
economic imagination is honour bound to take its bearings from Max Weber’s theatrically 
evocative treading of already well-worn boards (Weber, 1946) in earnest. The Freudian 
undertones of these sentiments are by no means coincidental. For Trilling, any post-War liberal 
reconstruction project had to embrace the compelling insights into the human condition 
emerging out of the human sciences in general and from psychoanalysis in particular. And yet, 
he nevertheless insisted to proponents of “an anthropological perspective” upon the 
coordination of human affairs that “literature has a unique relevance” (2008: xxi). So literature 
- not politics, the social sciences (or murketing, by implication) - “is the human activity that 
takes the fullest and most precise account of variousness, possibility, complexity and 
difficulty” (ibid.)”.  
 
Trilling, like Mirowski and Strauss, was the practitioner of a doubly hard sell: that of seeking 
to persuade his self of the very argument he was presenting to his assumed audiences. Literature 
(particularly tragic literature), he argued in both directions, matters to politics (and commerce) 
because of its perennial insights concerning the human condition and despite the 
misappropriations to which these have been and will continue to be subjected. While 
literature’s potential has been repeatedly annihilated within various moments of liberalism’s 
would-be political realisation, literature remains politically instructive within its absolute 
potentiality, that is, in the perennial mis-application of its evocations. It is probably on account 
of such convoluted formulations that, on more than one occasion, Menand categorised 
Trilling’s thinking not as paradoxical but as dialectical (Menand, 2008a: xii, 2008b). To be 
realistic by demanding the possible, Trilling might have said, is to recognise literature’s 
characteristic status as a politically imaginative resource.  
 
Honesty / Hypocrisy  
 
Trilling himself went on to have trouble accepting The Liberal Imagination’s earnest appeal to 
literature’s existential priority. In Sincerity and Authenticity (1972), he makes an implicit case 
against apologies for literature’s redemptive, palliative or pedagogical primacy such as his 
own. Erudition may well enhance our capacity for sounding honesty’s depths but, as Trilling 
went on to realise, public success has rarely been predicated upon studious solemnity. Such 
success, in fact, is much more likely hindered by heartfelt earnestness than it is helped by it. 
Individuals capable of persuasively appearing to their publics as solemn souls, by unfortunate 
contrast, frequently benefit from an instrumentally calculated mode of literary engagement. If 
one of erudition’s principle functions was to teach readers how to appear in public, rather than 
how to be in private, we’d be well advised to question its political value. And so it was for 
Trilling. Sincerity and Authenticity, as Menand put it, was his late teacher’s “last major work” 
(Menand, 2008b), a dialectical thinker’s characteristically ambivalent recollection of, and 
characteristically intellectualised response to, his experience of the 1968 Columbia University 
campus uprisings (ibid.).  
 
Lionel Trilling was no Herbert Marcuse. Nevertheless, he actively mediated between the 
students and the administration throughout the widely analysed period of turmoil, the 
consequences of which have been rigorously criticised (e.g. Wolters, 2013; Booth, 1974), 
fictionalised (e.g. Bradbury, 2000; Lodge 2008) and sociologised (e.g. Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2006; Habermas, 1986). Trilling publicly remonstrated against the disproportionate 
use of police violence throughout the period of discord. He did so in good faith, it seems, only 
to return to his office after the campus troubles to encounter graffiti - co-authored by actual 
and/or would-be victims on whose behalf he had taken the risk to speak – which singled him 
out as a pig (Menand, 2008b). Irritated by this stain on his furniture, mindful of this smear upon 
his character and fearful of the slur by implication this made upon the academy (as distinct 
from the police, the state and the market), Trilling took up intellectual arms in the library, later 
delivering his broadside from the podium. His intention throughout the lecture series upon 
which the book was based, Menand suggests, was to call out an evident paradox in order for 
the sake of facilitating a renewed period of honest and collective reflection about and within a 
critical historical moment.   
 
The earliest usage of the term sincerity, in French and then later in English, Trilling 
pronounced, originally “derived from the Latin word sincerus and first meant exactly what the 
Latin word means in its literal use – clean, or sound, or pure” (1972: 12). Dutifully tending to 
the business of etymological preliminaries incumbent upon anyone who would presume to 
lecture upon such a topic (p. ix), Trilling proceeded to note that the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
dating of the earliest French usage to 1549 is contradicted by Paul Robert’s Dictionnaire 
alphabétique et analogique de la langue française, which states 1475 to have been the earliest 
use of sincére and 1237 to have been the earliest use of sincérité (ibid.)3. At the beginning of 
the sixteenth century – and this is the hinge around which so much of Sincerity and 
Authenticity’s argument pivots - amidst the “decisive increase in the rate of social mobility, 
most especially in England but also in France” (ibid.: 15), sincerity’s usage undertook an 
important shift in emphasis, slowly withdrawing from the physical characterisation of the 
objectively inanimate and gradually buttressing moral and subjective idioms. Sincerity, that is, 
became an important means of characterising ourselves, and each other, though it demonstrably 
was not always so.   
 
                                                          
3 Trilling also mentions “an old and merely fanciful etymology, sine cera, without wax” (12-13), which would, if 
creditable, require us to date sincerity’s origin it back even earlier, since cera, is known to have existed as wax 
before 1237. This discredited attribution, Trilling continues, “serves to remind us that the word in its early use 
referred primarily not to persons but to things, both material and immaterial” (ibid.). It is very tempting to say 
something, concerning this non-connection, about the role played by wax within Rene Descartes’s meditative 
pursuit of certainty and indubitability and to speculate as to how they might have been undertaken without wax, 
that is, sincerely. Since there is no such connection between the word sincerity and the status of being without 
wax in fact, however, I will resist the temptation to elaborate in this regard. So should you.  
It is on the basis of sincerity’s radical shift in semantic emphasis, Trilling continues, that we 
should understand the culturally prolonged “captivation” with what political historians now 
describe as the Machiavellian moment (Pocock, 2016). This observation enables Trilling to 
account for the Elizabethan age’s dramatists’ exploitations of the notorious Florentine’s “false 
presentation of the self” (1972: 13) political prerogative for theatrical effect (see also Skinner, 
2014). So too, through this altering sense of sincerity’s referents, Trilling also invited his 
audience to understand the considerable level of public antipathy towards a “conception of the 
villain [that] survived well into the Victorian era” (Trilling, 1972: 14), that is, “the hypocrite-
villain, the conscious dissembler” (ibid.: 16). And it is also with regard to sincerity’s gradually 
discovered moral inflection, to offer a third of Trilling’s many examples, that he related the 
plain speaking imperative which he, following Karl Marx, deemed characteristic of Northern 
Europe’s urbanisation and industrialisation processes to the emergence of the genre within 
which authors cast themselves as characters within their own true stories: the autobiographical 
treatise. This aggregates to Trilling’s persistent contention that the deployment of sincerity 
became morally determined for reasons which were historical-sociological first and 
ideological-linguistic only afterwards.  
 
The paradox which was principally at stake, then as now, was the perennial discontinuity 
between words and deeds, that seemingly never to be exorcised spectre of hypocrisy. And the 
concept of sincerity provided Trilling with the keys to the crypt. Trilling suspected that the 
iconic student movement’s most outspoken members weren’t nearly as concerned with the 
mundane challenges of doing politics as they were with experiencing the heroic “gratifications 
of being political” (c.f. Menand, 2008b). And so Sincerity and Authenticity should, according 
to Menand, continue to be appreciated as Trilling’s concerted effort to put a biographically 
instantiated discrepancy between what people say they believe, on the one hand, and what 
people actually do, on the other, into a wider socio-historical context.  
 
Hypocrisy / Incredulity 
 
If we are to credit Lionel Trilling with revealing the origins and rise of sincerity as a rhetorical 
means – and I believe that we should – then we could also credit Jean-François Lyotard with 
diagnosing sincerity’s terminal demise and aftermath – though I’ll shortly provide reasons to 
oppose this decision. But why might we believe that sincerity has had its day? Why, that is to 
say, have so many of us today become predisposed to scoff at the efforts of Stanley Cavell 
(2002) – or, earlier and even more earnestly, of Immanuel Kant (1996) – to so conscientiously 
trace empirical utterances back to moral dispositions? Let’s ask one of Trilling’s seminal 
argument’s most appreciative revisionists, Roy Magill Jr.   
 
Although he doesn’t engage with The Postmodern Condition (Lyotard, 1979), Magill Jr. does 
credit ‘postmodernism’ (2012: 181-184; see also Brown, 1993; 1997; 2006; Firat and 
Venkatesh, 1995; Firat and Dholakia, 2006), the consequences of which the closing passages 
of Sincerity and Authenticity itself had already provisionally confronted, with having achieved 
something of a decisive separation, within the perspectives of authors and audiences alike, 
between the linguistic content of an utterance and the looming presence of any authorial 
intention(s). Call it the death of the author (Barthes, 1977), call it the intentional fallacy 
(Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1946), call it the erosion of the subject (Foucault, 2004: 421-422), or 
call it the ends of man (Derrida, 1969), it all amounts to the same thing in this connection: the 
abandonment of the idea that the one who said it, whatever it is, is morally obliged to have 
meant it. Whereas Trilling’s book could not observe the historical consequences of this 
reduction of the author to a matter of subtext, at least not with the benefit of sufficient hindsight, 
Magill Jr’s has.  
 
Consider the example of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose Confessions, according to Magill Jr 
echoing Trilling, “go furthest in promoting the ideal of sincerity as the highest moral goal” 
(2012: 84). Consider, in particular, how differently he must have sounded to his intended 
audience compared to how he sounds to us. Whereas the rhetorical intention of his confession 
that he went in for more than his fair share of guilt addled masturbation was to persuade his 
contemporaries to trust him, we who would still read The Confessions today are prepared to 
encounter it on its own terms, as it were: exorcised, that is, from the murky spectre of its author, 
self-loathingly onanistic or otherwise (Derrida, 1976: 141-164). Not only is this a plausible 
means of engaging with the text, it seems to have become an advisable, even predominant, 
hermeneutical strategy. The prevalent epistemological hygiene test, since Sincerity and 
Authenticity, is much less a business of determining whether – and if so why - one should 
believe the author, or not, and much more that of ascertaining whether - and if so why - 
whatever has been said can be deemed analytically consistent, or not. The riddle of authorial 
sincerity, throughout this recent twist, seems to have become very much beside the point, if not 
completely irrelevant. We’re all dissemblers now, it would appear, regardless of whether we’re 
consciously so or not.     
 
Sincerity, for Magill Jr., was always a ruse, always a bluff, always a distraction. His book is a 
polemic which doesn’t so much dance on sincerity’s grave as tell the story of why it has been 
long dead. And, edging more towards acceptance than lament, it advises us to move on, paying 
our respects, perhaps, but also encouraging us to repress all hope of resurrection. Much like 
sincerity’s initial entry into the moral idiom had for Trilling, this subsequent denigration of the 
value which we attribute to authorial sincerity, since the time of Sincerity and Authenticity, has 
had significant effects upon how we speak and write as well as upon how we listen and read. 
For not only do we today express a heightened degree of incredulity towards grand narratives, 
as Lyotard had it: audiences and authors today have also become accustomed, Magill Jr. 
suggests, to treating the sincere gesture itself – as with so much else - with implicit distrust and 
ironic ambivalence, if not outright hostility. This might even be a culturally conditioned 
defence mechanism. The postmodern condition’s legacy, beyond the academy, is not that we 
no longer distinguish between morality and immorality but that we no longer believe that 
utterances are the most reliable material with which to make such distinctions.  
 
MURKETING AND THE NEW SINCERITY 
 
Back now to Mirowski’s exemplary phenomenologist of murketing: David Foster Wallace. 
According to one of his best regarded essays (1993) and Adam Kelly’s influential series of 
commentaries upon its place within his work (Kelly, 2010, 2015, 2017; see also Dunne, 2018; 
Konstantinou, 2016, Hering, 2016; Michaelson, 2016; Parker, 2016; Styhre, 2016), it might be 
premature to culturally euthanize sincerity. In an interview which accompanied his 
demonstration that the injunction to just ‘act naturally’ has become impossible to obey, Wallace 
bluntly asserted that: “fiction’s about what it is to be a fucking human being” (McCaffery, 
1993). Opposing the stylised disaffection which characterised the work of some of his 
contemporaries – Bret Easton Ellis’s in particular - Wallace suggested that novelists should do 
more than merely “dramatize how dark and stupid everything is” (ibid). Wallace did not think 
that cynicism, scepticism, irony, meta-reflexivity, authorial disavowal, sensationalism and 
satire either could or even should have had their day. But he did believe that readers are entitled 
to expect more from fiction than mere entertainment, however edgy. And so he says: 
 
We all suffer alone in the real world; true empathy’s impossible. But if a piece of fiction 
can allow us imaginatively to identify with a character’s pain, we might then also more 
easily conceive of others identifying with our own. This is nourishing, redemptive; we 
become less alone inside. It might just be that simple (ibid.). 
 
By advocating such a view of fiction’s extra-aesthetic responsibilities, Wallace knew he’d 
sound both whiny and old-fashioned, particularly to a generation of readers long grown weary 
of literary morality tales. And yet he thought it better “to risk disapproval” than to wallow with 
his literary peers in the stylisation of solipsism. We’re not very far away from Trilling and 
Strauss’s aristocratic sense of literature’s extra-literary functions here. And we’re also now 
rounding out our account for why Mirowski knew the pedigree – Straussian or otherwise - of 
outsourcing the recognition of murketing’s technology, as well as the provisional articulation 
of its phenomenology, to a novelist.   
 
Wallace probably didn’t believe that the metaphysical affliction of anthropological solitude 
could be overcome through linguistic means: he had much more than a passing interest in 
Wittgenstein, after all (see Max, 2012). But he probably did believe that fiction both could and 
should help its readers help themselves feel less alone. So if Wallace’s work does make a plea 
for a new sincerity, it does so not by proposing an antithesis to irony but rather by provoking a 
sublation of sincerity’s demise both with and through irony. His advocacy of a new sincerity 
does not oblige its advocates to oppose irony because it complicated authorial intent: it does 
not oblige them to oppose irony at all, in fact. Instead, to endorse the new sincerity is to 
advocate the deliberate incorporation of irony’s capacity for complicating authorial intent into 
the craft of literary production. Unlike those for whom the stylisation of disaffected loneliness 
is an aesthetic end in itself – cynical apologetics, in other words - Wallace wanted irony to be 
incorporated into cultural production not so that authorial intent could be eliminated but so that 
it could be revealed through necessarily more complicated means.  
 
The old sincerity’s near fatal injury was a generally perceived rupture between what is said and 
what is meant. The new sincerity, by contrast, stylises this rupture, not in order to cringe at its 
discharge but rather to seek to do what can be done, if anything, in the way of healing. The 
earlier scars will remain visible, of course, for there is no value in nostalgia for the good old 
times when authorial intent and audience interpretation were perfectly aligned. Irony’s cultural 
generalisation requires practitioners and advocates of the new sincerity not to work in a non-
ironic or anti-ironic manner, but rather to deploy ironic devices towards sincere ends. This is 
much easier said, in cultural theory, than done, in cultural practice. Hence the earlier point 
made with McGurl: contemporary audiences as such are interpellated not so much by the text, 
nor by the context, but rather by just so many subtle gestures towards their interplay.  
 
Wallace made no apologies for placing such demands upon his audience. Rather than being 
obliged to make their literal meaning immediately transparent to all readers in the first instance, 
Wallace believed that fiction writers are entitled – obliged, indeed - to put their readers to work. 
This doesn’t mean ‘Finneganizing’ everything, as he so knowingly put it (Max, 2009). But it 
also doesn’t mean authorial self-exoneration or self-abdication. What it does mean is that the 
proponents of the new sincerity cannot hope to address all audiences, let alone set out to 
convince them.  
 
MURKETING’S NEWLY SINCERE DOUBLE TRUTH 
 
…is both Cynical and Gnostic 
 
The death knells of sincerity, if they have tolled, rung in the triumph of hermeneutical 
suspicion. The Kantian axiom Aude Sapere!, through which modern subjects are encouraged 
to question almost everything, may have unwittingly become the audacious affliction to end up 
believing almost nothing. Sincerity, in this telling, has become another casualty of the self-
regarding savvy through which we each do what we can to avoid appearing gullible, only to 
end up becoming cynical (Sloterdijk, 1987; see also Žižek, 1989, 1991). And it is in a widely 
shared recognition of this seemingly self-contradictory position, within which subjects both 
know the folly of acting in a particular way and yet act that way anyway, that psychoanalytic 
approaches to consumer research have recently undergone a renaissance (Berger, 2016; Cluley 
and Dunne, 2012, Cluley and Desmond, 2015; Fleming and Spicer, 2006; Roberts, 2015; Zwick 
and Bradshaw, 2016). Subjective resistance and behavioural obedience have come to be seen 
as compatible.  
 
But the alleged compatibility between believing one thing and doing another isn’t just a matter 
for psychoanalysts. Both Gorgias and Protagoras sold their wares on the understanding that 
rhetoric dares to speaks in the places from which logic withdraws. As both Barbara Cassin 
(2000) and Michael Billig (1996, see also Antaki and Condor, 2014) have shown, rhetorical 
analysis sheds important light upon psychoanalysis’s relentless attempts to wrench coherence 
from the apparently incoherent. The exposition of contradiction is a matter for the logician. 
The practical resolution of perceived contradiction, by contrast, forms a large part of craft of 
the free murketeer. It is no coincidence that Mirowski’s analysis acknowledges the role and 
significance of cognitive dissonance theory.    
 
Whether it be in the calculated deployment of irony (Stern, 1990; Frank and Weiland, 1997; 
Brown, 2005), the recuperation of marketing strategies into modes of resistance (Klein, 2010; 
Kozinets, 2002; Heath et al., 2017) or the simulated re-appropriation of the linguistic and 
aesthetic means of communicative production (Higgins and Tadajewski, 2002), contemporary 
consumers have long been required to play or be played, especially when the game of 
persuasion is called out (Hackley, 2003). Calling out the game of persuasion, indeed, has 
become just another way of playing it. And so if you’re not yet paranoid, it’s only because 
you’ve not been paying enough attention to the game. They are indeed out to get you, regardless 
of what you think! We both know this all too well and yet act as if we didn’t. And we seem to 
have persuaded ourselves of the need to no longer transcend murketing’s double truth dialectic.  
 
…is both Conceited and Intimate 
 
Rather than seeking to sincerely inform its audience as to the facts of the matter, murketing 
frequently choreographs a flirtation like situation. Roland Barthes was more than aware of this 
kind of strategy when he wrote of literary seduction (1975; see also Baudrillard, 1990). A little 
bit of slap and tickle then (Brown, 2004). The intended audience knows how to play along with 
no small amount of intrigue as to where it all might lead, winking and rib-elbowing along. 
Murketing does not tell it like it is because it knows that persuasion is best done indirectly. 
What it does, instead, is confide, through tongue in cheek, banter and other such subtle gestures 
(ten Bos, 2011, 2005; see also Schmidt 2012), about how we’re all now past sincerity, about 
how only a fool would continue to expect words alone to say all there is to be said. And that’s 
the allusive mode of the new sincerity. That’s the irony which makes earnestness possible. It 
is an interaction predicated upon a shared but unsaid acceptance of how nothing essential, 
within such a context, can ever be told like it is. The innuendo – the knowingly unsaid – is 
precisely where the truth resides. To call the game out is to stop playing the game. This is 
precisely why the game should never be called out. We’re not far from the Symposium here. 
 
A nuanced sense of intimacy develops between those who have correctly decoded the signs, 
not despite the allusiveness but because of them. This is a sense of intimacy not unlike that 
established through the sharing of a joke which the majority cannot indulge in, the in-joke 
which works because others are not in on it. Or at least that’s the allure. Murketing frequently 
affects the likeness of no longer expecting, of no longer even caring, about being regarded with 
sincerity. This is how it establishes a clandestine mode of unspoken intimacy. In order for the 
new sincerity to persuade – its interpellation has to be hearkened rather than heard. Perfect 
information is the economic myth: disingenuous persuasion is the murketing reality. And, if 
you do get caught saying what you really mean, you can always just say it’s just a joke. 
Earnestness can always take cover under irony. Intimacy can always give way to conceitedness. 
There’s no way of telling for sure any more. That’s the basis on which we communicate within 
a world where murketing has taken hold.  
 
To those not impressed by the implicit or explicit conceit, it’s always possible to say it’s just a 
joke. And with those who manage to get the unspoken message – that it really isn’t a joke after 
all - an unspoken and unbreakable bond is established. Here’s Angel Nagel, whose work 
indicates the growing chasm between mimetic dissemination and personal responsibility 
(2017a, see also Miles, 2014, 2010 and Persuit, 2013), on how the ‘only joking’ refrain has 
taken hold online: 
 
The standard online shtick for politically serious members of the alt-right has been to 
flirt with Nazism but then to laugh at anyone who took these gestures at face value 
(2017b). 
 
Pepsi probably sought to establish this unspoken sense of intimacy by alluding to 
#BlackLivesMatter in a recent campaign4. And Coca-Cola also probably tried to commoditise 
global anti-Trump sentiment when they re-ran their #Americaisbeautiful campaign5. To master 
the rhetoric of murketing is to know how to negotiate the turbulent space between 
conceitedness and intimacy. It is to know how to formulate sufficiently ambiguous signals, 
rather than vulgarly unambiguous messages. Both Pepsi and Coke set out to do this recently. 
Coke did it better.   
 
…is both Earnest and Ironic 
 
On the 14th of September 2017, the billionaire Alan Sugar announced to the House of Lords 
that contemporary gambling advertising was both “too clever” and “too alluring”. He made 
particular reference to an ongoing bet365 advertising campaign, within which an often de-
capitated and gravity disobeying Ray Winstone espouses his responsible way of gambling. 
Sugar was careful to disassociate the character played by the talking head from the man himself, 
partially for fear of being “thumped”. He nevertheless lambasted its pretence to responsible 
                                                          
4 See: https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/news/pepsi-advert-pulled-kendall-jenner-
protest-video-cancelled-removed-a7668986.html 
 
5 See: http://uk.businessinsider.com/coke-pre-game-america-the-beautiful-super-bowl-ad-has-aired-before-
2017-2  
 
gambling as “Pathetic. Absolutely pathetic”. He also criticised present advertising legislation 
for being “weak and inadequate”.6 Let’s call this an earnest response to a perceived problem.    
 
Back in 2014, the Responsible Gambling Trust operating as Gamble Aware also took issue 
with “Ray’s” (head’s) claims to gambling responsibly. Their attack, in contradistinction to 
Sugar’s, was much less overtly sincere. It’s hard not to think of satire, of subvertisement, and 
of detournement (Debord, 1984; Lasn, 2001) when you watch it7. Whereas the billionaire made 
a critical issue of the claim towards responsible gambling itself, unveiling its inherent silliness 
as if this weren’t already apparent, Gamble Aware went instead along the rhetorical strategy of 
reduction ad absurdum: what would the world be like were Ray to have in fact been speaking 
the truth? We all know the ‘I gamble responsibly’ phrase is pathetic, as Sugar put it: little more 
than a calculated attempt to pre-empt regulation. So let’s take it seriously rather than seeing 
through it. Hence “Debt 365” and all the rest of it. What else could responsible gambling truly 
mean?, the ironic response to a perceived problem asks on our behalf.     
 
bet365, for its part, has been able to incorporate and perhaps has even had the foresight to 
anticipate both forms of criticism. Leaving the empirical question of what gambling 
responsibly actually means to the presiding regulatory body, the underlying meaning of Ray 
Winstone’s claim – performed almost as a threat made on behalf of “bet365”, that he gambles 
“responsibly”, provokes all sorts of pedantic epistemological gymnastics, not least of all: 
 
1. What sort of subject worries about whether the character Ray Winstone, affected by the 
actor Ray Winstone, for a fee paid to him by the legal entity bet365, gambles “responsibly”?  
 
2. This character, responsible gambler or not, is setting prices. So what is it: a buyer or a 
seller?  
 
a. If it is a buyer, it is an insider trader committing a criminal offence right in front of 
our eyes. 
b. If it is a seller, its claim to gamble responsibly is a boast that the game it is trying 
to convince us to play is rigged against us. Surely that will only persuade the 
audience not to gamble with bet365 and as such defeats contradicts its sole reason 
for being 
 
3. If the character is neither an insider trader making an ill-advised confession, nor a scornful 
corporate ally mocking its consumers, perhaps it is comparable to a martyr: a figure who 
gambles responsibly, on our behalf, so that we don’t have to. Behold the spectre of 
gambling responsibility being presented not as a model to aspire towards but rather as a 
model of gambling from which we’re encouraged to deny. “Ray” gambles responsibly, 
thereby paying for all of the sins of us essentially irresponsible gamblers. 
  
We can easily rule out all of the above, of course, once we recall what we all already know, 
namely, that the statement isn’t supposed to be taken seriously in the first place. bet365, 
whatever it is, obviously already knows this too. And that's the conceit: that’s the open secret 
which we’re all now invited to participate in by the murketeer. That, also, is precisely how 
intimacy is established through contemporary murketing. One of the world’s most famous 
                                                          
6 YouTube has it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RYkLXA1xnLM 
 
7 YouTube has it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WyiLEW5WAYk  
Donald Trump impersonators8 and one of Britain’s more inventive subvertisers both struggle 
to get ahead of this rhetorical strategy. Murketeers know both that and how their opponents are 
going to try to play them. The hidden dissuaders are going to have to up their game: they’re 
rank outsiders at the moment.      
 
DISCUSSION  
 
The rhetoric of the new sincerity is more than a linguistic subtlety or a rhetorical nicety: it 
harbours crucial political-economic dimensions, not least of all in our dealings with distributed 
and aggregated agents in general and with corporations in particular. Should scholars of 
marketing rhetoric follow the fetishization of the commodity insofar as it is the semiotics of 
the brand to which the consumer often primarily relates? Or should we instead see through the 
rhetorical epiphenomena in order to gaze directly upon the forces and relations of production 
which are the consumer’s interpretation of the brand’s very conditions of possibility?  
 
The answer now - just as it was for Jean Baudrillard, for Wolfgang Fritz Haug and for Stuart 
Hall - is that we should endeavour to both. For the free murketeer, on the one hand, sincerity 
seems to have become strategic aesthetics: a matter of persuasive performance. For Mirowski’s 
Wallace, on the other hand, sincerity predicates just so much corporatized subterfuge. We 
should call it a feature of this predicament, rather than a failing, that there seems to be no 
logical, epistemological or normative grounds upon which either side of this argument can 
bring the other over, or even be externally judged to have made the most compelling case. And 
yet we’ve all got our opinions. 
 
As a potential means of responding to this critical impasse, this paper has attempted to use the 
term murketing in an entirely descriptive manner, just as we might describe any other craft. 
The ambition throughout, to be clear, hasn’t been to oppose this mode of persuasion but to 
describe it. For now, it remains instead incumbent upon marketing scholars in general, and 
scholars of marketing rhetoric in particular, to acknowledge murketing as a skilful deployment 
of the new sincerity, so that we might better come to terms with the craft’s nature, function and 
trajectory. The paper has therefore put murketing’s emergence into a longer historical, cultural 
and political-economic context and delineated some of its challenging though not quite 
contradictory enunciative characteristics. It has also provided some provisional hermeneutical 
guidance as to how murketing practice might be studied empirically within further studies, by 
means of example.  
 
Not only does the rhetoric of the new sincerity provide marketing scholars with one possible 
means of overcoming the false opposition between commodity fetishism and labour process 
theory, between aesthetics and legal theory and between semiotics and political economy, as 
well as a few interpretive clues for subsequent work, it also makes an implicit case for evidence 
based policy intervention. The current debate over the regulation of gambling advertising bears 
more than a passing resemblance to an earlier debate over film censorship. Then, between the 
affectedness of earnest moralism, on the one hand, and the disaffectedness of libertarian 
permissiveness, on the other, emerged the recognition that while suggestiveness and 
vulnerability are moral issues, their regulation is a matter for empiricism. So it should be here. 
The regulation of murketing should take its bearings from the specificities of murketing’s 
double-truth dialectic and of the individual’s awareness of this. Policy intervention should be 
predicated much more upon how audiences receive rhetoric – whether sincere, ironic or newly 
                                                          
8 Alan Sugar hosts the UK’s version of TV Show The Apprentice 
sincere - and much less upon how murketers, regulators and critics believe they receive it. This 
doesn’t only apply to the regulation of gambling murketing but to any attempt at regulating 
murketing as such.  
 
I’ve left the last few words for criticism. Although he opposes much of what Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) and Social Studies of Finance (SSF) practitioners have had to say about markets 
and economics, Mirowski’s account of how contemporary consumers participate within their 
own persuasion endorses the spirit of Bruno Latour’s influential critique of contemporary 
criticism’s hermeneutics of suspicion (2004). The main upshot here is that it simply shouldn’t 
matter to scholars of marketing rhetoric whether Mirowski (or Klein, or Packard, or Chomsky, 
or Stanley, or Bernays, or whoever) like or loathe prevalent modes of persuasion. We should 
rather concern ourselves with the plausibility, or otherwise, of the accounts of rhetoric’s 
manifestation which such work provides. Following Latour, we might say that the critique of 
marketing rhetoric hasn’t even had the chance to run out of steam. We’d need an adequate 
transport infrastructure before any energy expenditure assessment can become viable: we don’t 
even have that yet. Contemporary analysis and critique of marketing rhetoric must not consist 
in complaining about the fact that marketing is rhetorical (on which see Schuster, 2016). We 
should rather delineate how persuasion occurs today. Under the heading of murketing, we seem 
to have become wilful participants in our own manipulation. We’d all do well to think a bit 
more about that.  
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